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Abstrak 
Artikel ini mendiskusikan persoalan maskulinisme dalam pengetahuan dan 
aktivitas ilmiah serta menelusuri strategi epistemologis alternatif dalam 
rangka mencapai model pengetahuan yang membebaskan dan tanpa dominasi. 
Dalam perspektif feminisme, isu mendasar dalam epistemologi dan filsafat 
ilmu mainstream adalah konsep pengetahuan dan praktek ilmiah yang 
diterima mengingkari pengaruh dimensi sosial dan politik terhadap aktivitas 
mengetahui beserta hasil-hasilnya. Analisis feminis melihat bahwa dominasi 
laki-laki dan maskulinisme yang mencirikan struktur dan norma sosial yang 
mapan telah mereproduksi karakter dominatif tersebut ke dalam praktik dan 
standard pengetahuan yang objektif. Artikel ini bermaksud untuk menjawab 
dua pertanyaan. Pertama, bagaimana maskulinisme sebagai norma sosial dan 
politik yang dominan mempengaruhi produksi pengetahuan? Kedua, strategi 
epistemologi apa yang dapat ditempuh untuk menghasilkan pengetahuan 
yang membebaskan dan tidak bersifat mendominasi? Teori pengetahuan 
feminis berlandaskan pada keyakinan bahwa penyelidikan rasional adalah 
praktik sosial di mana gender sebagai norma dan referensi kultural dan politik 
memberikan pengaruh mendalam terhadap proses mengetahui dan hasil-
hasilnya. Teori pengetahuan yang membebaskan mensyaratkan pengakuan 
terhadap berbagai metode dan model pengetahuan yang sesuai dengan situasi 
spesifik subjek yang mengetahui. Dengan pemahaman epistemologi tersebut, 
pemikir feminis memformulasikan berbagai strategi mengetahui untuk 
mereduksi muatan maskulinisme dalam praktik pengetahuan dan ilmu yang 
mapan. 
Kata-kata kunci: epistemologi feminis, produksi pengetahuan, gender, 
maskulinisme 
 
Abstract 
This paper discusses problems in dealing with masculinized knowledge and 
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scientific enterprises, and seeks alternative epistemological strategies in 
achieving liberating and un-dominated knowledge production. A general 
problem with "mainstream" epistemology and philosophy of science from 
feminist perspectives is that the well accepted concept of knowledge and 
scientific practices derived from it deny the impacts of social and political 
dimension toward knowing activities and their results. Feminists observed 
that men and their masculinities have been reproducing their social and 
political domination into the practices and standard of objective knowledge. 
The paper takes on two questions. First, how masculinity as dominant social 
and political norm has influence the production of knowledge? Second, what 
epistemological strategies would allow the production of less dominating and 
liberating knowledge? Feminist theories of knowledge built on the belief that 
rational inquiry is social practice through which gender as cultural and 
political norms and reference give deep impacts toward knowing process and 
it results. A theory of liberating knowledge requires acknowledgement and 
acceptance of multiple methods and models of knowledge in accordance to 
specific situation of the knowing subjects. Through such epistemological 
understanding feminist theorists formulated epistemological strategies to 
reduce masculinity in the rational inquiries and well accepted science. 
Keywords: feminist epistemology, knowledge production, gender, masculinity 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses feminist theories in dealing with 
masculinized knowledge and in exploring alternative epistemological 
strategies to produce liberating and un-dominated knowledge. The 
mainstream epistemology and the philosophy of science derived from 
it have been operating under the assumption that the social position 
and gendered bodies of subject of knowledge have no relevance on 
epistemological endeavor (Nelson 1995). Many theoretical streams in 
epistemology and the philosophy of science show very little interest in 
bringing claims on knowledge, epistemological framework, or 
epistemology itself into historical consideration. There has been long 
existed among the most influential epistemological traditions the 
premise that a general theory of knowledge is possible.  
It is exactly against this premise that feminist theorists have 
launched their critics toward mainstream epistemological thinking 
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and further developed their own theories of knowledge. In contrast to 
the mainstream epistemology, the very premise of feminist 
epistemology asserts that rational inquiry is a social endeavor 
(Longino 1990; Nelson 1993). Feminist theorists heavily stress on the 
significance of the social, cultural and political context on the activity 
of knowing. In this context, gender deeply affects the knowledge 
production by the knowing subject. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter 
(1993), for example, suggest that the social status and “the sexed body 
of the knower” have impact on the production of knowledge and 
further to the notion of "universality" of knowledge being sought and 
claimed by mainstream epistemological enterprise (p. 13).  This 
“universal” notion of knowledge presumes that subject of knowledge 
has no gender and represents anyone capable of undertaking rational 
activities. However, as Code argues, such epistemological model 
implicitly presupposes a male knower (Code 1991). That is to argue 
that the contemporary epistemological core model is the embodiment 
of men’s way knowing and men’s way thinking.  
As a tradition of epistemology, feminist epistemological 
inquiries centre on a range of influences of gender as social norms, 
discourses and social structure on the production of knowledge. At 
the same time, feminist theorists analyse how the production of 
knowledge give impact to social, political and cultural standing of 
women and other marginalised groups. There is no, or may never, 
single representation of feminist epistemology (Alcoff and Potter 
1993). Feminist epistemology comprises of diverse (and not always 
compatible each other), dynamic and far from complete theoretical 
projects (Nelson 1995).  
While demonstrating very strong critical orientation, feminist 
epistemology seriously takes constructive efforts further. Critical 
characteristic uncovers various forms of masculine tendencies at the 
center of philosophical enterprises on topics such as objectivity, 
reason, subjectivity, knowledge, and rationality. Constructive element 
of feminist epistemology includes engraving out rooms for feminist 
intellectual inquiries, exploring and constructing models for liberating 
or non-dominating theoretical agendas. In this constructive 
epistemology field, feminist standpoint theory, feminist empiricism, 
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and, increasingly, feminist pragmatism are the most profound 
contributors to the tradition (See Lloyd 1984, Code 1991, 1995, 
Harding 1986, 1991, Rooney 1994, 1995, Anderson 1995, Solomon 
1995, also Alcoff and Potter 1993, Lennon and Whitford 1994). 
In response to the mainstream theories of knowledge, feminist 
epistemological project drives toward two main objectives. First, it 
attempts to reveal various forms and levels of sexism and masculine 
bias lying under theoretical inquiries. Second, feminist epistemology 
seeks to provide theoretical grounds which incorporate a commitment 
to liberation of women and other socially and politically oppressed 
groups of people (Longino 1993a). With regards to these aims, this 
article addresses two central questions within feminist 
epistemological inquiries. First, how masculinity take forms in the 
production of knowledge? Second, what epistemological strategies 
would allow the production of less dominating and liberating 
knowledge? 
 
DISCUSSION 
Knowledge Production and Masculine Domination 
One of the most well accepted notions of knowledge in the 
Western epistemological tradition is presented in the formula “S 
knows that P”.   This formula presumes object of knowledge to be 
independent and readily observable to the mind of the knower. At the 
same time it requires subject of knowledge to be impersonal, 
emotionally detached, oriented to things rather than persons, and 
oriented to an “objective” form of its knowledge object. The 
impersonality of subject of knowledge presumes that the knowing 
subject has no sex. This formula shapes the widely adopted 
conceptions of objectivity that asserts the possibility of objective 
knowledge as the “view from nowhere” (Daston and Gallison 2007). 
This conception implies that all other points of view are invalid or 
biased.  
That requirement of subject of knowledge to be impersonal, 
emotionally detached, and oriented to things rather than persons and 
independent to the object sits at the center of feminist critic on 
epistemology. Feminists such as Sandra Harding (1989) and Susan 
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Bordo (1995) had revealed that such features of subject are 
stereotypically attributed to men and represent masculine gendered 
symbols. These features are in conjunction with the dominant 
gendered representation of masculinity and femininity as opposed 
each other and mutually exclusive. What is more dangerous, such set 
of features, in feminist perspective, implicitly abandon the epistemic 
capabilities and authority of women and other marginalized groups. 
It is a shared notion within feminist theories that objectivity has 
history and produced within certain historical contexts (Daston and 
Gallison 2007). Gender is a crucial dimension shaping that historical 
context.    
A crucial aspect of feminist critical tradition examines how 
mainstream epistemological concepts give impacts to political, social 
and cultural marginalization of women and other subordinate groups. 
Feminist critiques focus on how the notion of impersonal, emotionally 
detached and independent subject has created masculine domination 
and epistemic exclusion toward women and other marginalized 
groups. Feminist critiques identify at least two main implications of 
this theory of knowledge that produce masculine domination in 
epistemological enterprises, namely epistemic injustice and epistemic 
ignorance.  
Epistemic injustice takes place when mainstream theory of 
knowledge allows the dominant groups to monopolize epistemic 
authority for themselves. At the same time they disregard the 
epistemic capacity of subordinate groups by creating stereotypes that 
stigmatize subordinate groups as incompetent or untruthful with 
regard to the production of knowledge. They promote cultural 
markers that symbolize epistemic authority based on characteristics 
associated with their group such as sense on honor, moral credibility 
or political importance among elites group of men (Addelson 1983; 
Shapin 1994). Political, social and cultural structures allow the 
dominant group to secure access to these markers, namely access to 
institutions of knowledge such as higher education is made limited 
against subordinate groups. This power oriented tendencies 
undermines the ability of subordinate groups to contribute to 
epistemological enterprise, whereby committing epistemic injustice 
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against these groups. The dominant group of epistemological 
narrative particularly referred to White, middle-upper class, males.  
A frequent case that can be categorized as a form of epistemic 
injustice is what Fricker (2007) calls “testimonial injustice.” It refers to 
a scenario when dominant epistemic atmosphere lead society, partly 
or in majority, to disregard credibility of marginalized individuals or 
groups to voice out their narrative because of prejudice against these 
groups or their low social standing. Official denials of testimonies by 
women or children victims of sexual abuse committed by respected or 
powerful public figures (political leaders, religious leaders, adored 
celebrities, university professors) are frequent cases of testimonial 
injustice. Dotson (2011) explains that testimonial injustice operates in 
two mechanisms, namely silencing and smothering. Testimony 
silencing operates when the narrator’s testimony being denied or 
disregarded particularly on the basis of prejudice against the 
narrator's identity or credibility. Testimony smothering occurs when 
the a member subordinate groups silences her own voices or keeps 
her story out of recognition due to fear of being misunderstood, 
denied, or causing more harmful prejudice their own groups and her 
identity. For example, women victims of exploitation (sexually, 
economically, religiously or politically) are often reluctant to voice out 
or testify against powerful and respected figures or institutions 
because their testimony more likely to reinforce cultural prejudices 
against women for being weak, sexually provoking, dishonest, 
morally weak, emotional or intellectually incompetent.  
Hookway (2010) argues that testimonial injustice politically and 
socially excludes subordinate groups from participation in the 
production of public knowledge in general. Such epistemic exclusion 
may take forms in the exclusion of subordinate groups to engage in 
the activities of knowledge production including asking questions, 
proposing different perspectives or points of view, raising objections, 
and suggesting alternative arguments. When the dominant epistemic 
community does not take such contributions into serious 
consideration out of prejudice against the speaker’s social and cultural 
identity, epistemic injustice is taking place against the speaker both as 
a subject of knowledge and as a member of epistemic community. 
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There is a close link between epistemic injustices and 
epistemologies of ignorance. Epistemic injustice involves systematic 
ignorance that affects the social and political standing of subordinated 
groups as subject of knowledge. Epistemic ignorance may take forms 
in deliberately forgetting or taking no attention to certain crucial 
matters in the knowledge production. The authoritative knowledge 
institutions, for example, possess the capacity to develop knowledge 
meaningful to subordinated groups but chose to ignore the 
importance of such knowledge (Tuana 2006). The negligence of 
women’s philosophers in the canonic history of Western philosophy is 
a very clear example of such ignorance. Epistemic ignorance also 
closes the possibilities of or represses academic enterprises that 
uncover the prevalent injustices system and practices.     
According to Margonis (2007) epistemic ignorance could have 
further implications in weakening the capacities of subordinate 
groups to disseminate their knowledge to other groups, whereby 
diminishing their epistemic impact. In most cases, dominant groups 
would avoid the production of knowledge that lead to the truth of 
their own injustices system and practices (Margonis 2007). They could 
further establish hermeneutical ignorance that hinders their 
consideration and intellectual sense from the voices of the 
marginalized groups. 
The discussion on epistemic domination above reinforces 
feminist points of view that epistemological inquiries are socially 
value-laden enterprises. What is more important, these value-laden 
rational endeavors have impacts on subordinating structure in the 
society. An aspect that feminist theorists employ to explain the social 
dimension of academic inquiry is the pragmatic component of 
scientific practice (Anderson 1995b).  
Such pragmatic component precisely lays in very first step of 
research practice that is the research question. Every academic inquiry 
starts with questions). As Anderson (1995) observes, research 
questions may not be solely urged by rational motivation. A range of 
more practical interests in understanding particular phenomenon or 
in understanding problematic situations can also in fact lead to 
research questions. In such a common scenario, a scientific inquiry 
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bears practical purposes too. The outcome of that inquiry then is 
directed by these rational cum-pragmatic interests. The pragmatic 
component of scientific inquiry suggests new aspect of judgment of 
theories. A theory can not only be evaluated based on their adequate 
supporting evidence to assure their credibility, but further based on 
their cognitive accessibility to the situated knowing subject upon 
application (Anderson 1995). 
Even those theorists who strongly believe in the value-
neutrality of rational knowledge and science are aware that pragmatic 
interests contribute to the choice of objects of scientific inquiries. This 
means that pragmatic interests, including social, cultural and political 
ones, are epistemic resources that shape the knowledge production. 
Different pragmatic interests will generate different inquiries and seek 
to discover different aspects of the world (Anderson 1995). However, 
supporters of dominant notion of value-neutrality in academic 
inquiries assert that when the research activities in taking place using 
rational instruments the scientific discoveries are fully determined by 
the natural world. In contrast to this notion, feminist epistemologists 
argue that the practical interests produce deeper impacts into how the 
discoveries are achieved. Subject of knowledge, in fact, play a more 
active role in constituting the object of knowledge than merely using 
the rational instruments. Here, “constitution” of object means in term 
of representational and causal. In term of representational, the 
knowing subject constitute the object of knowledge by creating terms 
or concepts to represent it, and by defining the context through which 
the representation is working. According to Helen Longino (1990), if 
knowing is comparable to seeing, every act of seeing is a form of 
“seeing as” and different interests will lead to see the “same” things 
differently. This is an avoidable implication if subject of knowledge is 
understood to be situated in certain context. This is further 
implication when subject of knowledge, or their identities, are 
considered to be socially constructed. 
Feminist philosophers of science strongly emphasize how 
social, cultural and political values bring a range of influence in 
scientific activities and practices (Wylie and Nelson 2007). They 
examine how certain values are embodied in particular scientific 
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practices and critically analyze whether these values hinder the 
discoveries of particular un-desirable facts, induce dogmatic thinking 
among subjects of knowledge, or isolate their findings from critical 
scrutiny, or whether these values open possibility for new discoveries 
(Anderson 2004). Privilege entitled to dominant groups and 
prejudices against marginalized groups are common contributors of 
such social values which provide reference for rational inquiries.  
Anderson (1995) suggests that feminist theory on the social 
construction of rational inquiry brings two implications. First, the 
knowledge resulted from practices of inquiry may leave the traces of 
the social circumstances of the inquirers. It is fundamental to state that 
gender is crucial element of that circumstance that affects theoretical 
inquiry. Second, as feminist critiques reject certain ways through 
which gender brings the dominating characters the dominant groups 
into products of inquiry, demanding subjects of inquiry to be 
somehow detached from their gender or gender-related values is not 
the solution to address that domination (Anderson 1995). 
 
Feminist Theories of Objectivity 
The feminist critiques of epistemology identified masculine and 
class biases in the concept of objectivity which affect rational inquiries. 
They further took various attempts to develop feminist theories of 
objectivity.  In doing so, feminist epistemologists and philosophers of 
science passed up debate on the ontological field, namely evaluating 
subject/object dichotomy, which define objectivity in the form of an a 
priori concept about what considered to be really exists. They opted to 
let the debate of what kinds of reality exist open.  
Feminist theories of knowledge generally shared a clear 
intention to open room for plurality in ways of knowing. Epistemic 
communities have different interests, approach different aspects of the 
same world, and from that they build a range of theories to address 
particular epistemic and pragmatic issues. While a theory of the 
empirical world can only be justified through its supporting 
evidences, such procedure remains open for emergence of multiple 
theories with every theory may proclaim its own adequacy. Along 
with this acceptance of pluralistic models and method of knowing, 
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most feminists epistemologist do not see the necessity of unifying 
these different models or theories, considering that they contain 
truths, into a single grand model of knowing which apply a single 
language or a single set of theoretical terms (Longino 2001). Harding 
(1998) and followed by Longino (2001) suggest that as long as 
different epistemic communities could maintain the adequacy of their 
associated theories in accordance to recognized standards, and open 
to criticism, their model of knowledge may each judged as objective. 
This is regardless different contents their theories may contain. 
However, Intemann (2011) challenges the risk of unlimited theoretical 
pluralism in democratic spirit which is supported by Longino (1990) 
and Solomon (2001). She contends that if sexism and racism exist in a 
scientific theories following sustained examination, then such cannot 
be funded or taken seriously. 
Feminist epistemologists give strong emphasize on the 
situatedness or perspective-relativity of much knowledge that human 
reason can produce. However, they do not thereby embrace 
relativistic epistemology (Anderson 1995). To consider some 
knowledge claims or form of understanding as situated in certain 
perspectives is not to suggest that the perspective reveals true beliefs 
or acceptable understandings. Similarly, it does not mean that 
particular situated perspectives can only be judged according to their 
own terms. It is important to state that feminist epistemology does not 
reject the possibility or desirability to produce of objective knowledge. 
What feminist epistemologists do is proposing new perspectives 
about objectivity. 
Feminist theories of knowledge have developed their 
conception of knowledge production centered to the notion of 
situatedness of knowledge. With this regard, three broad 
epistemological traditions have taken shape: feminist standpoint 
theory, feminist postmodern, and feminist empiricism (Harding 1990). 
Feminists standpoint theory believe that particular perspective 
departing from disadvantageous position, i.e. women and 
marginalized groups, inhabit epistemic privilege. However, 
postmodern feminists reject such claims of epistemic privilege, while 
give emphasize on the contingency and instability of the social 
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identity of knowing subjects and their representations. Feminists 
empiricist explore framework to differentiate the situation in which 
situatedness of the knower creates bias and in which circumstances it 
provides a resource to advance knowledge. This notion expands a 
conception of objectivity as constituted by critical while cooperative 
relations among different situated knowers. 
A number of feminist theorists stressed the epistemic benefit of 
involving emotional response to the object of knowledge for the 
constitution of knowledge. Emotions could serve as epistemic 
functions crucial for moral and political inquiry mediating inquirers 
to specifics features of the world he/she trying to know (Jaggar 1989, 
Little 1995, Anderson 2005). Generally in social science disciplines, 
emotional engagement with one's subjects of study is often required 
to understand and interpret sensitive issues or unique phenomenon. 
The fields of anthropology, sociology or human geography for 
examples, enquirers often need to build trust from their subjects and 
to attain a rapport with them to interpret their complex and unique 
world (Hrdy 1986).  
It was Evelyn Fox Keller (1985a) who has developed an idea of 
objectivity as emotional engagement with object of knowledge in her 
concept of “dynamic objectivity.” With dynamic objectivity, enquirers 
employ a mode of perception based on sense of love toward the 
objects. Keller argues that this way of knowing is more adequate 
compared to objectivity as detachment. This is precisely because this 
way does not involve a neurotic requirement to allay anxieties about 
maintaining the independence of the knowing subject by dominating 
the object of study, as stated in the mainstream epistemology doctrine. 
Longino (1993b) has objected to Keller's concept on with reason that 
while dynamic objectivity may involve a less neurotic mode of 
relation with the world, this does not show that as an epistemology 
concept it is better one. Keller's study of Barbara McClintock's ground 
breaking discovery of genetic transposition (1983), proposed an 
exemplary model of Keller’s dynamic objectivity. McClintock’s study 
demonstrated the epistemic advantage of sense of love toward the 
objects of study. 
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Moving further from Keller’s theory of knowledge, Sandra 
Harding (1993) argued that the objectivity of knowledge should be 
sought through reflexivity. Harding is a key figure in feminist 
standpoint theory. Notion of reflexivity asks subject of knowledge to 
posit themselves on the same circumstances or situation as the object 
of knowledge. When constituting their knowledge, enquirers must 
explicitly reveal their social positions, interests, background 
assumptions, biases, and other contingent. The same goes with their 
perspectival features that shape their inquiry questions, research 
methods, and interpretations which the enquirers apply during 
knowing process. With such reflexivity strategy, Harding admitted 
the partiality of any representations while not denying their 
possibility to claim truth (Harding 1993). The theory implies that 
representation can be true without achieving the whole truth about 
the object being represented. Reflexivity enhances objectivity by 
avoiding overlapping between one's own partial perspective and a 
comprehensive view, and by highlighting dependency of 
representation that could be questioned. Harding argued (1993) that 
inclusion of marginalized groups into rational inquiry will enhance 
reflexivity.  This is because the marginalized groups are more likely to 
encounter with components of accepted representations shaped by 
unchallenged application of the perspectives of the dominant groups.  
Harding (1993) advanced her theory of strong objectivity by 
further including democratic inclusion as key feature of objective 
inquiry in addition to principle of reflexivity. She formulated this 
notion as a reconfiguration of standpoint theory. The theory entitles 
the standpoints of marginalized groups a fundamental role in 
achieving objective knowledge. However, according to strong 
objectivity, such epistemic privilege does not apply to the standpoints 
of the oppressed when considered from their own terms. Rather, it 
prefers representation constituted by communities that include them 
over representations created by communities that exclude them. 
However, feminist postmodernists’ critique of standpoint 
theory suggests that there is no in fact a single overreaching women’s 
group that legitimately represent women’s standpoint which therefore 
warrant epistemic superiority (Harding 1998). Socially, politically and 
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culturally women’s situation and experience are vary and this give 
rise of the multiple standpoints of subaltern women's (namely black, 
Latina, lesbian, postcolonial, religious.). Postmodernists critique has 
encouraged many standpoint theorists to end the agenda of searching 
for a single women’s standpoint that can claim feminist epistemic 
superiority. They opted to move to a pluralistic direction by 
welcoming multiple situated standpoints arising out of intersecting 
subordinated groups (Harding 1998; Collins 1990). Harding (1998) 
argued that a system of knowledge that integrates these multiple 
insights and evolves out from their unique experiences will be richer 
compared to one that draws on the insights of and develops from the 
predicaments of dominant groups alone. To make it simpler, in terms 
of knowing strategy, thinking from multiple standpoints from variety 
of subaltern perspectives gives more advantage than sticking in one's 
thinking to dominant perspective. This means, the standpoint theory 
moves the epistemic advantage point from the context of justification 
of being marginalized to the discovery of morally or politically 
significant truths arising out of multiple subaltern standpoints. This 
shift can also be understood in terms of pragmatic advantages: 
thinking from multiple and pluralistic standpoints allows the vision 
and realization of more just social relations (Collins 1990, Hartsock 
1996).  
Wylie (2003) explained among different versions of feminist 
standpoint two points are being shared. First, standpoint theory 
rejects essentialism or the idea that the certain groups reveals any 
standpoint would represent fixed nature of their group or that 
members of this group would do or to think the same. Second, 
standpoint theory   rejects any intention to entitle automatic epistemic 
privilege to any particular standpoint. Wylie (2003) asserts that the 
social circumstance of “insider-outsiders” (or members of 
disadvantaged groups as subject of knowledge) can sometimes afford 
a contingent epistemic advantage in solving particular problems they 
encounter. Seen from this pluralistic orientation, feminist standpoints 
implies shared epistemic spirit with feminist postmodernism while at 
the same time their inclination also toward more empiricism 
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pragmatic approach which is at many point shared with feminist 
empiricism. 
Longino (1990, 2001) has developed more fully a conception of 
objectivity based on democratic discussion. Her key idea is that the 
production of knowledge is a social enterprise, secured through 
critical while cooperative interactions among inquirers. This strategy 
fully takes rational inquiry as social enterprises. As social enterprise, 
the results of this academic inquiry in considered to be more objective 
if they are more responsive to criticism. This notion developed from a 
long tradition including J.S. Mill, Karl Popper, and Paul Feyerabend 
(Lloyd 1997a). Feminists develop this tradition by proposing three 
aspects. First, by giving a more articulate conception of “all points of 
view,” through emphasize on the influence of the social positions of 
inquirers on the representation models they create. Second, feminists 
suggest a more empirically component in the account of the social 
relational characteristic of different communities of inquiry (e.g., 
Potter 1993, 2001). Third, feminist theories give a greater stress on the 
importance of equality among imagined plural inquirers.  
In Longino's (2001) proposal of epistemology, a rational inquiry 
is objective, and therefore its product can be accepted as knowledge, if 
it shows four requirements. First, it offers public rooms for the 
criticism of its knowledge claims. Second, it responds to criticisms by 
changing its contents of theories according to, and three, publicly 
considered standards of scientific evaluation. Last, it adheres to a 
norm of equality of epistemic authority among community of 
enquirers. The last component of objectivity, the requirement of 
acknowledgement of equality of intellectual authority represents the 
democratic feature of Longino’s theory. However, it also invites 
criticism, given the demand to acknowledge equality among different 
enquirers with different expertise and competence. In respond these 
criticism, supporters of this democratic model of objectivity have 
specified the norm of equality in order to distinguish legitimate 
differences of expertise and competence among enquirers from 
illegitimate epistemic interaction. An illegitimate form of democratic 
model occurs when a group exercises its social power to exclude some 
criticisms such as those coming from disadvantaged groups from 
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participating in the epistemic interaction (Anderson 1995b, Longino 
2001). 
During its development, theorists adopting postmodern 
feminists have shown similar direction toward other influential 
streams in feminist epistemology. Some feminists inspired by 
postmodernism sought middle and more stable bases that feminist 
empiricists and standpoint theorists can share. Donna Haraway 
(1989), considered as proponent of feminist postmodernist, showed 
exemplary attempt by expressing tributes to the achievements of 
feminist scholars adopting empiricist framework and standards. 
Haraway (1991) further have taken attempts to reconstruct models of 
objectivity and epistemic responsibility which show consistency with 
the principle of situated knowledge. Similarly, Fraser (1995) urged for 
reformulation of feminist postmodernism approach toward a more 
pragmatic orientation while employing fallibilism and 
contextualization of knowledge claims, avoiding categorical rejections 
of grand social theory, normative philosophy and even humanist 
values. 
Today, the three feminist epistemological streams increasing 
show more agreement than disagreement and they share inclination 
toward each other. However, it is important to mention that different 
views regarding how social values give impact to objectivity do 
persist among the three streams (Intemann 2010). Feminist empiricist 
theory stressed how pluralism of values within enquirer community 
will allow critical examination of unquestioned underlying 
assumptions of rational inquiry. It also multiplies potential fruitful 
hypotheses. Meanwhile, feminist standpoint supporters argued that 
better values produce better theories. In response to this, feminist 
empiricists have accepted the value claim of standpoint theory with 
notes that these claims are kept contingent and local (Wylie and 
Nelson 2007).  
 
CONCLUSION 
In their early phase, feminist theories on epistemology and 
philosophy of science paid their greatest attention to explore general 
questions about the inter-link between gender and knowledge. They 
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questioned: Do mainstream conceptions and practices of knowledge 
production, objectivity, and science embody masculine or 
androcentric feature and sentiment? Do men and women have 
different reasoning styles manifested in different ways of knowing? 
This new field of epistemic investigation has steadily evolved toward 
enquiries on different ways gender is constructed in practice of 
knowledge production in specific subject matters, among particular 
communities of inquiry, and using distinct methods. This shift to 
more local and particular investigation has led the three streams in 
feminist epistemological thinking into convergence direction. 
As an epistemology tradition, feminist theories share 
commitment to reveal multiple-overlapping routes through which 
gender as social-cultural norms, ideology and political structure 
works in the production and reproduction of knowledge.  The 
feminist theories maintain their focus on the principle of situated 
knowledge while giving strong emphasis on the interplay between 
facts and values. The tradition generally rejects the concept of 
transcendental-overreaching standpoints while encouraging plurality 
of theories. These themes are all in one way or the others shared by 
the three feminist epistemology streams. 
Gender is not the only social-cultural dimension that shapes the 
production of knowledge. Epistemic authority is built upon a set 
symbols and values that includes not only gender, but also race, class, 
sexuality, culture, religion and age. If feminist epistemology is an 
embodiment liberating knowledge project, it must address all forms 
of domination because women in fact fill the population of every 
category of subordinated marginalised people. To claim for an 
epistemic liberatory project, feminists cannot only work for or about 
women, but all forms of subordinated groups.    
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